In a …rm organized into business units, we show when pro…tability increases if procurement is delegated to the division in charge of production. We highlight that our results are driven by the business unit having a di¤erent objective function than Headquarters. The pro…tability of procurement delegation is a¤ected by the essentiality of production facilities to the activities of the …rm, and by strategic distortions in both transfer and input prices. We also look at vertical separation of activities as an alternative to procurement delegation.
Introduction
In multinational …rms, the mix of centralized and delegated activities varies from one …rm to another, and this is also the case for procurement. Procter and Gamble, for instance, centralises product development or accounting while business units are responsible for sales and procurement, whereas in General Electric business units are also in charge of sales but procurement is centralised.
1 In a KPMG survey (2008) 75% of respondents consider procurement of a high strategic priority, and nearly half of …rms in the survey use some form of decentralized procurement. Most importantly for our purposes, the survey also highlights that the internal organization of procurement may a¤ect prices charged by suppliers.
A transfer pricing system for internal transactions lets a multinational company to transform its divisions into business units or pro…t centers. Because divisional managers tend to be evaluated according to how well the division they are in charge of performs, the introduction of a transfer price system is a powerful incentive mechanism that a¤ects their decision making.
2 This paper analyses the decision of a …rm to delegate or centralize the procurement of essential inputs to business units in charge of production. We show under which circumstances delegation of procurement may increase …rm's clout when bargaining with suppliers. When there is an increase in bargaining power, it comes from the use of a delegated agent (namely the manager of the business unit in charge of production) in bargaining with a di¤erent objective function from Headquarters. Crucially, we show that the transfer price system can be set in a way that there are no distortions in production decisions but still lead to discounts in the price of inputs.
We model the following …rm's problem. In order to produce …rm's good, the …rm must acquire an input. The input can be obtained from two di¤erent sources: an e¢ cient supplier or an alternative (for instance, a fringe of standard suppliers or internally). The implementation of a transfer price scheme allows the …rm to decentralize production decisions to business units. Before production starts, the Headquarters chooses who leads procurement negotiations: it may keep procurement centralized, or it may delegate it to the factory manager.
Regardless of who negotiates procurement, we show that, when a two part tari¤ is allowed, the agreement between the …rm and the supplier leads to e¢ cient production levels. To achieve e¢ ciency, the HQ adjusts the transfer price depending on the outcome of the bargaining stage. Still, announcing the HQ delegates procurement negotiations to the factory manager has an impact over the rents the supplier can reap in the bargaining stage. We show that delegating bargaining negotiations to a di¤erent agent from HQ, in this case the factory manager, allows the …rm to shift pro…ts away from the bargaining stage which in turn lowers the willingness to pay to the e¢ cient supplier. Thus, announcing how the …rm is organized is what provides an strategic edge, serving as a commiment device, and not the speci…cs of the transfer price. As pointed out by Gimeno (2012) observability and irreversability of delegation instruments are essential for using delegation strategically. Several instruments are public, at least partially. One example is compensation schemes for CEO of public limited companies, but another instance, closer to our model, is the creation of autonomous divisions such as pro…t centers.
To check the robustness of our result, we …rst study whether other organizational arrangements rather than delegating procurement to the factory manager may increase …rm's bargaining strenght. We show that vertically separating the company allows the company to divert rents from bargaining through a di¤erent channel, but it is not always a superior way of organizing procurement activities. By vertically separating the company the supplier becomes a less determinant player to achieve the rents to be bargained. Secondly, we also extend our basic result by assuming that the HQ can announce at which transfer price the …rm is internally trading. When procurement is delegated to the factory, and the HQ can credibly announce a transfer price, the …rm …nds optimal to distort the internal price at the cost of producing ine¢ ciently. Setting the internal price arti…cially low lets the …rm shift even more pro…ts from the bargaining stage. However and unlike 2 Using transfer pricing is a common practice for multinational …rms (see for instance Tang, 2002 where 90% of the surveyed …rms use transfer pricing). Moreover, performance evaluation of subsidiaries is one of the main objectives of decentralizing decisions through transfer pricing (Borkowsky, 1996) . Acknowledging that tax purposes is key to understand how transfer pricing is set, according to Ernst and Young (2003) , around 40% of the …rms consider that achieving management/operational objectives has a stronger in ‡uence than tax purposes. the existing literature, it is not always in the HQ's best interest: the use of this strategic transfer price does not allow the …rm to adapt to the outcome of the negotiation stage.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze some economic forces that may moderate our main result over delegation. To this end, we consider …rst whether the factory is not essential for the company and can be replaced by an external alternative. In this case, the …rm only centralizes procurement when the external alternative is highly attractive otherwise the …rm prefers delegating procurement to take advantage of an improvement in the negotiations. Second, we study a situation in which the supplier may behave strategically and may announce a tari¤ at which the …rm and the supplier trade. We show that when the HQ delegates procurement negotiations to the business unit, both the factory and the supplier may …nd pro…table to negotiate an input price di¤erent from the e¢ cient one. This intended high input price fosters the HQ to set a transfer price di¤erent from the e¢ cient one. Eventually, this increases both supplier's and factory's pro…t at the cost of a lower …rm's pro…t. As a consequence, HQ's tends to centralize both procurement and production to avoid this undesirable outcome.
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature. First, our paper can be seen as an illustration of the use of delegated agents in bargaining …rstly initiated by Schelling (1960) . Delegating decisions may serve as a commitment device; using a third agent may allow the player to obtain some strategic advantage, since the agent playing the game can commit to a certain behavior. However, as noted by Katz (1991) , delegation might not be useful if binding contracts are not observable. Although observability of contracts is an important feature to make commitments valid, Fershtman and Kalai (1997) …nds out conditions under which the delegation to an agent has still some impact. In particular, they show that an incentive contract even if the speci…c details of the contract are unknown may have a commitment e¤ect.
3 More recently and from an experimental perspective, several authors pointed out that delegating to an agent might help the …rm to act tougher when bargaining Gneezy, 2001 or Hamman et al, 2010) . Second, our paper relates to the literature on transfer pricing iniciated in the seminal paper of Hirshlei¤er (1956) . Our paper is not the …rst attempt at analyzing the strategic impact of using transfer pricing. Since Alles and Datar (1998) a very important strand of the literature has focused on the strategic use of transfer pricing, i.e., setting the transfer price away from e¢ cient considerations, in order to gain some competitive advantage (see Baldenius and Reichelstein, 2006 as a more recent examples focused on buyer-seller relationships). 4 However, as fas as we know, there is no research analyzing the impact of this type of strategic delegation on procurement activities. An exception and the closer paper to ours is Arya et al (2007) . The authors analyze the interaction between procurement activities and decentralization of production activities through a TP scheme. The authors obtain that divisionalization of the …rm improve …rm's pro…t through a reduction of the supplier's bill. This improvement is obtained because the …rm is able to credibly commit to the use of strategic T P greatly reducing pro…ts of the division (through a double marginalization e¤ect). The supplier must then reduce his demands, lowering the price that can be imposed to the division. Although we also focus on how internal organization a¤ect procurement outcomes, initially we do not allow the …rm to use transfer prices statregically and second we allow the …rm and the supplier to use more complex contracts, a two part tari¤ rather than a linear one, when negotiating for the input. Thus, delegation result is not merely based on the interaction of the e¢ ciency distortions created by the contract and the transfer price, but a consequence of how the …rm is internally designed.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the main characteristics of the model. In Section 3, we show when delegation of procurement improves …rm's bargaining clout and compare it to other organizational arrangements. We also show in this Section which conditions are needed for the …rm to implement an strategic transfer price. Finally, in Section 4, we present two di¤erent situations in which the …rm may prefer to keep procurement centralized: when the factory is not an essential input and when the supplier may behave strategically. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are left in an Appendix.
The model
The …rm, composed by a factory and a sales division, organizes its production activity as a business unit.
Costs and revenues. Revenues R(q) satisfy R 0 > 0; R" 0. Production costs are given by C(q), with C 0 > 0; C" > 0. To produce the good the …rm must acquire an essential input on a one-to-one basis for each unit of output produced. There exists two sources for the input, one more e¢ cient than the other. The e¢ cient one features marginal costs of production c 1 whereas the less e¢ cient procures the input at a higher unit cost c 2 > c 1 . We will name the e¢ cient source as the e¢ cient supplier or simply the supplier whereas the ine¢ cient source will be named the alternative. 5 We assume that the parties in the negotiation can use a two-part tari¤ T (q) = F + wq where w is the marginal wholesale price and F is the …xed component. Thus pro…ts of the …rm are R(q) C(q) T (q). The quantity q that maximize …rm's pro…ts satis…es the …rst-order condition
as the level of pro…ts that can be achieved (gross of any fee paid to suppliers). Our assumptions on revenues and cost guarantees the existence of a unique solution q(w) to this maximization problem, strictly decreasing in the input cost, q 0 (w) = 1 R" C" < 0; and that the pro…t is decreasing in the input cost, 0 (w) = q(w) < 0. It is clear that under our technological assumptions optimality involves the use of the e¢ cient supplier. Assume that the …rm and this supplier are indeed one entity; in this 5 One interpretation of the source of input c 2 is that the …rm can alternatively obtain the input from a less e¢ cient competitive fringe. In this case, payments to the competitive suppliers become T (q) = c 2 q. An alternative interpretation is that the …rm produces the input internally rather than buying it from the market. Still another interpretation of this industry structure is that the …rm is in negotiations with a labour union to implement new production methods. The old way of producing the output leads to a marginal cost c 2 whereas the introduction of the new method leads to a new marginal cost c 1 . The labour union and the …rm bargain over wages, w, and other bene…ts, F (see Zhao, 1998 , 2001 and Chongvilaivan et al, 2013 for a related discussion on internal organization and labor unions) 6 FOC are necessary and su¢ cient for a unique global maximum since the problem is strictly concave. Note that SOC are R 00 C 00 < 0 according to our assumptions on R and C.
case, the …rm produces q(c 1 ) which leads to (c 1 ) as the maximum rents that the …rm can achieve. If, instead, the …rm produces using the alternative, both the quantity, q(c 2 ), and the rents generated, (c 2 ), are lower. The di¤erence of pro…ts between choosing the supplier or the alternative, (c 1 ) (c 2 ), can be shared between the …rm and the supplier. The aim of this paper is to study how the allocation of authority over procurement may a¤ect whether this increase in rents is achieved, and its e¤ect on the distribution of these rents.
Timing. The whole interaction between the HQ, the factory and the supplier is as follows: First, the HQ allocates authority over procurement decisions (to be discussed below). Then the …rm must produce the good, which involves two stages: …rst, to negotiate with the supplier the terms of the contract T (q), and second, after reaching (or not) an agreement, production of the good.
Note that this timing allows the …rm to adjust production decisions to the outcome of the negotiation stage, that is, to adjust production in accordance to the real marginal cost. This ‡exibility assumption is crucial to our analysis. If production decisions were taken before the bargaining stage, and could not be modi…ed afterwards, the supplier would take advantage of this situation capturing larger rents at the negotiation stage; 7 foreseeing what would happen in the bargaining stage, the …rm would presumably reduce its production in the …rst place, leading to lower total pro…ts.
Firm organization over production. The …rm organizes its production activity as a business unit. In charge of the business unit there will be a manager that must maximize the pro…ts of the factory. The HQ sets a transfer price p and the business unit will have pro…ts pq C(q) T (q). Given a unit price of the input w and a transfer price p, de…ne
as production that maximizes the business unit's pro…ts,
as the pro…ts then achieved by the business unit (gross of any fee paid to suppliers) and …nally
as those achieved by the whole …rm (also gross of any fee paid to suppliers). As we know since Hirschleifer (1956) , pro…ts in (1) can be achieved in a decentralized way if HQ set a transfer price p(w) = R 0 (q(w)), since then the factory fully internalizes the impact of production in …rm's pro…ts. Thus the business unit produces the optimal quantity, q(p(w); w) = q(w) and we have (p(w); w) = (w). De…ne then
as the pro…ts of the business unit when the transfer price is set optimally. 7 Assume for instance that the …rm commits to q = q (c 1 ) then there are no e¢ cient distortions with the e¢ cient supplier. It is easy to see that
) c 2 q (c 1 ) and the last inequality holds since (c 2 ) maximizes pro…ts when the input cost is c 2 Procurement. The HQ must allocate authority over procurement decisions. Under Centralized procurement (or C ), it is the HQ who bargains with the supplier, whereas under Delegated procurement (or D) the business unit manager is in charge of negotiations. In either case, the …rm and the supplier bargain over a two-part tari¤ T (q) = F + wq, and furthermore we assume all agents involved have equal bargaining power.
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Regardless of …rm's organization, the supplier has pro…ts s = T (q) c 1 q in case of agreement whereas its outside option is to achieve zero pro…ts. If there is Centralized procurement, the alternative for HQ is to achieve pro…ts (c 2 ). Hence, if there is agreement the joint pro…ts of the …rm and the supplier increase from JP
With Delegated procurement, the alternative for the manager of the business unit is to achieve f (p; c 2 ). If there is agreement the joint pro…ts of the business unit and the supplier increase from JP D of f = f (p; c 2 ) to
Given our assumptions of equal bargaining power by those involved in negotiations, the payment will cover costs of production c 1 q and assign half of the extra rents JP JP of f to the supplier. The assignment of those rents depends on who is actually bargaining with the supplier, the HQ and the factory manager, and whether parties involved in bargaining can alter strategically the transfer price p or the input price w.
Organization as an strategic device
In this section we analyze the strategic role of the allocation of procurement decisions. First, we show that e¢ ciency over production can be achieved by means of e¢ cient bargaining and then we show that the …rm gains clout over the supplier by assigning procurement decisions to the business unit manager. The details of the Nash bargaining program both under centralized and delegated procurement are left in Appendix A.
When there is Centralized procurement, it is straightforward to see that q(c 1 ) is the quantity that maximizes JP C . This can be achieved by setting w = c 1 and, at the production stage, setting a transfer price p (c 1 ) = R 0 (q(c 1 )). Thus, total surplus JP C = (c 1 ) is achieved and rents are redistributed through a …xed payment
In the presence of Delegated procurement, to represent the interaction that lead to nonstrategic contracts is more convoluted. HQ cannot commit to a particular transfer price p, and the factory and the supplier can renegotiate the tari¤ at any moment. We can represent their interaction as follows: …rst, the business unit and the supplier negotiate the terms of the contract. Then, the business unit communicates to HQ the outcome of the negotiation stage, that is, whether there is agreement and the details of the contract; but those details have no strategic e¤ect on the transfer price that HQ sets, since the tari¤ can be modi…ed. In case of disagreement, the HQ sets the optimal transfer price that maximizes pro…ts when marginal cost of the input is c 2 , the …rm achieves pro…ts (c 2 ) and the factory have pro…ts f (c 2 ).
When there is agreement between the factory and the supplier, they choose the tari¤ that maximize joint pro…ts in (6) given their expectation about the transfer price p. For any such expectation on p, in order to produce the quantity that maximizes (6), the tari¤ must feature a marginal payment w equal to the marginal cost of the input, c 1 . Therefore, what matters is whether there is agreement or not in the negotiation; HQ knows that any announced tari¤ featuring w 6 = c 1 would be renegotiated afterwards. Whenever an agreement is announced, since the HQ expects w = c 1 , it sets the optimal transfer price p(c 1 ) = R 0 (q(c 1 )). The joint pro…ts of the factory and the supplier in (6) when the transfer price is p(c 1 ) become f (c 1 ) and the fee in the tari¤ will split equally the extra surplus created through the agreement,
Thus, no matter who negotiates the contract with the supplier, there is e¢ cient production q(c 1 ) when there is a deal with the supplier, and production q(c 2 ) in case of no deal. Hence, any preference HQ have for one structure or the other must come from a di¤erent distribution of the surplus between the …rm and the supplier; in other words, the HQ should choose the allocation of authority that minimizes the …xed payment to the supplier.
The following Proposition states the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1 If R" < 0, then payments under Delegated procurement are lower than under Centralized procurement,
According to Proposition 1, allocating authority over procurement to the factory manager reduces the fee paid to the supplier (F D < F C ) without changes in total surplus. Crucially this reduction of payments is not obtained because the factory makes di¤er-ent production decisions but because the amount of pro…ts to be bargained are di¤erent depending on who is negotiating the terms of the agreement. Rewrite …rm's pro…t as:
where R 0 (q(w))q(w) is the transfer payment to the factory. Delegation of procurement is pro…table whenever R (q(w)) R 0 (q(w))q(w) > 0 is increasing in the e¢ ciency of the …rm
In words, Delegated procurement is the best way to organize procurement not because the rents to be obtained in case of agreement are lower (not because f (c 1 ) < (c 1 )) but because the increase in rents for the factory in case of agreement f (c 1 )
f (c 2 ) is lower than the increase for the whole …rm (c 1 ) (c 2 ). This requires revenues to be strictly concave (R" < 0), since otherwise both increases f (c 1 ) f (c 2 ) and (c 1 ) (c 2 ) become equal. The strategic e¤ect of delegation is not driven by using strategically transfer prices since the HQ sets the transfer price that maximizes …rm's pro…t, given the marginal cost of production. The organization itself serves as a commitment device, or, in other words, the 9 We are of course assuming that production optimally adapts to the real marginal cost c 1 or c 2 .
strategic delegation in procurement activities is e¤ective as long as the organization itself cannot be easily modi…ed. Thus, our result requires observability of internal organization, but structural arrangements such pro…t centers or autonomous divisions are potentially public unlike internal transfer prices which requires further conditions to assume observability and irreversibility.
The following …gure graphically represents the di¤erence between …rm's revenues (R (q)) and transfer payment (R 0 (q) q) for two frequently used demand functions (linear and CES). and input costs T (q) = F + wq, optimal production, namely, the one solving (1), is q(w) = 1 w b+m and gross pro…ts (i.e. not taking into account the fee) are (w) =
. At the production stage, the factory produces q(p; w) = centralizes procurement, the fee in (7) becomes
and net pro…ts are
If the …rm decentralizes procurement, the fee in (8) becomes
Direct comparison of equations (9) and (11) show that the fee paid to the supplier is lower under Delegated procurement, F C > F D , whenever < 1 and similarly comparing equations (10) and (12) show that pro…ts under Delegated procurement are higher, C > D , whenever < 1.
The HQ could introduce a contract that links manager's payment to …rm's performance and not only to factory's success. That is, factory's manager incentives could be a combination of both corporate and divisional performance, that is,
with weights chosen by HQ. If = 1, the manager just tries to maximize …rm's pro…ts; when 0 < 1, the objective function of the manager is not perfectly aligned with …rm's interests. It is clear that Proposition 1 extends to any that satis…es 0 < 1. And, moreover, the optimal incentive contract, in terms of minimizing payments to the supplier, is = 0.
One might consider other organizational arrangements rather than delegated procurement to gain clout over the supplier. For instance, the HQ could vertically split the company in two di¤erent entities: one owning the retail store being able to obtain revenues R(q) and the other entity owning the factory with costs C(q). Under Vertical Separation, or simply V S, the HQ of the former company plays no further role in production and the manager of the factory becomes HQ of the new company, taking over both procurement and production decisions. When the HQ chooses to create two companies assume the HQ cares about total pro…ts of the …rm, that is (c 1 ) T V S (q) where T V S (q) is the payment to the supplier in the vertical separation case. In other words, assume perfectly capital markets that allows the HQ from the sale of the factory obtaining a payment that covers exactly the pro…ts of the separated entity.
We use the Shapley Value as a solution concept of the negotiation with three players involved in sharing the rents, the sales company, the factory company and the supplier.
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In this simple case, the rents of the grand coalition are (c 1 ). The supplier is not needed to 11 Similar results could be obtained if instead of the Shapley value we use simultaneous negotiations achieve (c 2 ) but it becomes as essential as the factory and the sales division to generate the extra rents (c 1 ) (c 2 ). Therefore, the pro…ts of the supplier will be 1 3
( (c 1 ) (c 2 )). The allocation of pro…ts can be achieved by a two part tari¤ with an input price equal to the marginal cost of production c 1 and a fee:
It is immediate from equations (9) and (13)) that payments under vertical separation are lower than under centralized procurement, F V S < F C . The intuition for this result is that under centralized procurement, the …rm and the supplier equally share the rents generated, (c 1 ) (c 2 ) whereas in the separating case, the supplier needs to agree with two other companies making the supplier less determinant to achieve the extra rents.
Then, when comparing delegated procurement and vertical separation, we observe that both organizational structures reduce the …xed payment as compared to the centralized procurement case. Under delegated procurement, some rents are transferred out of the negotiation through a transfer price scheme, whereas, under separation, some of the rents are outside the negotiation since the company is split into two di¤erent entities. While under delegated procurement the share of factory's pro…ts with respect the total company's pro…t depends on the optimal transfer price, that is,
, under vertical separation, the share retained by the factory remains constant, that is, the supplier always retains
( (c 1 ) (c 2 )). Therefore, the preference of one structure over the other depends crucially on the cost/revenue structure.
In the linear demand and quadratic cost case, we can explicitly compare both organizational arrangements. In particular, from equation (11) and (13) ; 1 .
Transfer Price Commitment
The previous section shows that delegation of procurement when the …rm is organized through business units allows the …rm to set aside some rents from negotiation. The result is obtained even if the choice of internal pricing is nonstrategic. Could the …rm improve this situation by credibly announcing to an observable transfer price? By credibly committing to an observable transfer price, the …rm may deviate from e¢ cient considerations (can set p 6 = R 0 (q (c 1 ))) trying to a¤ect supplier's behavior. However, committing to a transfer processes. Formally the approach used here to share rents is a cooperative game in which we have N = 3 players (the grand coalition) and a characteristic function v : S ! R from the set of all possible coalitions of players to a set of payments that satis…es v (?) = 0. The Shapley value gives any player i his (average) contribution to a coalition, where the contribution is taken over all possible coalitions to which a player i might belong. More formally, a player's i's share of the rents are given by
where n is the total number of players and the sum extends over all subsets S belonging to N not containing player i.
price also implies the …rm cannot adapt its transfer price to the outcome of the negotiation stage.
12 Thus, we can slightly modify the timing on our set-up to account for the possibility that the HQ sets transfer prices strategically: …rst, HQ announces the allocation of authority over procurement decisions. If the …rm centralizes procurement, the game is the same as previously stated but in case the …rm delegates procurement, the HQ publicly announces one particular transfer price at which divisions trade. Afterwards, the factory manager bargains with the supplier, and …nally produces according to the preciously announced transfer price and the outcome of the bargaining stage. We use H to denote actions and payo¤s when the HQ delegates procurement and uses the transfer price strategically. Under delegated procurement, the level of production is chosen optimally according to (2), and the bargaining process leads to e¢ cient production, w = c 1 . The argument is similar to the one in the nonstrategic situation in Section 2: the supplier prefers to reduce the marginal wholesale price to increase total rents and grab some of those rents through the …xed component, being
Thus, when setting the transfer price, HQ chooses p to maximize,
where (p; c 1 ) are the operating pro…ts for a given transfer price p and an input price c 1 .
The optimal strategic transfer price p H solves the following …rst order condition:
In words, the …rst term in (15) is the direct e¤ect on rents when transfer price is changed, whereas the second term is the strategic e¤ect of the transfer price on the outcome of the negotiation. The strategic e¤ect is always negative, higher transfer prices a¤ects negatively pro…ts through higher fees since pro…ts of the factory increase at a higher rate when the …rm works with the e¢ cient source of the input. The sign of the direct e¤ect depends on the choice of the strategic transfer price: it is positive if p < R 0 (q(p; c 1 )) whereas it is negative otherwise. Therefore, the following Proposition states whether it is convenient to distort or not (and how) transfer prices.
Proposition 2 If HQ can commit to a transfer price p H before bargaining takes place, then the optimal transfer price satis…es p H < R 0 (q(c 1 )) and pro…ts under Delegated procurement are higher than in Centralized procurement,
Proposition 2 extends Proposition 1 when transfer prices are strategic; delegating procurement activities to business units provides larger pro…ts than keeping them at the HQ level. In both strategic and nonstrategic transfer pricing, the relevant feature of delegating procurement to the business unit manager is that the factory has more clout than HQ when negotiating the fee with the supplier, because an increase in production costs have less impact on factory pro…ts than on those of the company as a whole. In the strategic situation, committing to a transfer price allows the …rm to further reduce the relevance of an agreement in factory pro…ts. Against intuition, however, commitment to a transfer price does not guarantee the …rm larger pro…ts (not even to pay a lower fee to the supplier) than in the absence of commitment. The reason is that committing to a transfer price, the …rm cannot adapt to the outcome of the negotiation stage.
To see this, note that pro…ts under nonstrategic transfer pricing are those in (12) whereas equation (14) evaluated at p = R 0 (q (c 1 )) leads to
and therefore
, that is, pro…ts under strategic transfer price jump down, not because reduced e¢ ciency in equilibrium but because the alternative becomes less valuable when transfer prices cannot adapt to the true marginal cost of the factory ( f (c 2 ) > f (p (c 1 ) ; c 2 )). We …rst show a case when the distortion of the transfer price can never compensate this (discrete) fall in pro…ts. Moreover, we show that not only pro…ts decrease but the lack of adaptability also increases fees to be paid to the supplier. To see these e¤ects, we analyze the marginal change of fees when the cost of the alternative changes marginally both under strategic and nonstrategic transfer price. When the price is strategically set
where p H solves (15). First, an increase in the cost of the alternative raises the fee due to a reduction on …rm's bargaining (…rst element of the rhs of the previous equation). The …rm can reduce the impact of this e¤ect by modifying the transfer price (i.e., by reducing it, @p H @c 2 < 0), which in turn reduces the quantity to be produced and eventually the fee. Note crucially that the positive impact of the strategic transfer prices on the fee depends on the (di¤erent) quantity produced with the supplier and the alternative.
Instead, when prices are nonstrategic, an increase in the cost of the alternative has a di¤erent e¤ect on fees:
where p(c 2 ) = R 0 (q(c 2 )) is the nonstrategic transfer price. The …rst e¤ect accounts for the loss in …rm's bargaining power while the second e¤ect is an adaptive e¤ect: the …rm modi…es the transfer price according to the real marginal cost in case negotiations fail reducing the impact of this increase. The following Lemma compares fees when the alternative is highly e¢ cient, c 2 = c 1 + " with " small. Lemma 1 Fees under strategic transfer prices are larger than under nonstrategic transfer pricing when the alternative cost is in a neighborhood of c 1 .
When the alternative is as e¢ cient as the supplier, that is, when c 1 = c 2 , the strategic and the nonstrategic transfer prices are identical, and the fees paid to the supplier, as well. However, when the cost of the alternative increases (marginally) nonstrategic transfer price adapts the price to the real marginal cost under the alternative. The impact on fees when the …rm uses strategic transfer price depends crucially on the quantity produced in equilibrium and under the alternative. When the alternative is as e¢ cient as the supplier this e¤ect is negligible and therefore fees are larger than under nonstrategic transfer pricing.
Therefore, since distorting the optimal transfer price leads to lower operating pro…ts (immediate consequence from Lemma 2) the result in Lemma 1 has immediate consequences on pro…ts under both strategic and nonstrategic transfer pricing Proposition 3 Pro…ts under strategic transfer price are lower than under nonstrategic transfer price when the alternative cost is in a neighborhood of c 1 .
In words, committing to a transfer price does not allow the …rm to adapt the transfer price to the real marginal cost reducing pro…ts in the alternative (the HQ loses the adaptive e¤ect). The bene…t of a transfer price consists in distorting it to reduce the fees and improve pro…ts. When the alternative is highly e¢ cient, it makes no sense to distort transfer prices since there are no gains at the fee level and pro…ts are strictly lower than the nonstrategic case.
When the alternative worsens (when the alternative is not in the neighborhood of c 1 ), the use of strategic pricing may be bene…cial since the jump down due to committing to a transfer price is lower and second distorting the transfer prices has an impact over fees (since
. We analyze this possibility by means of the linear demand and quadratic cost case and we obtain that committing to a price is pro…table in cases in which is crucial to gain leverage at the negotiation stage. The use of strategic transfer prices makes sense when the cost of the alternative is high and/or when …rm's cost/revenue structure makes di¢ cult for the …rm to reduce factory's pro…ts through nonstrategic transfer prices, that is, for large.
We can compare pro…ts and fees both under the strategic and under the nonstrategic transfer pricing when demand is linear generating revenues R (q) = 1 b 2costs are quadratic C (q) = m 2 q 2 and supplier's cost is normalized to cero, c 1 = 0 and rewrite c 2 = c < 1. We know from Section 3 that delegation under nonstrategic transfer prices leads to fees F D in (11) and pro…ts D in (12). Under strategic transfer prices, the optimal transfer price is
otherwise which leads to fees
and pro…ts
Comparing equations (12) and (18) for pro…ts and equations (11) and (17) for fees lead to the following Proposition Proposition 4 In the linear demand and quadratic cost case, fees are lower under strategic transfer prices, F H < F D , i¤ c g( ), and pro…ts are higher under strategic transfer prices,
and g( ) < f ( ).
The solid line in Figure 3 represents the combinations of parameters such that above the solid line the …rm prefers using strategic transfer prices, while the dashed line represents the combination of parameters such that the fee paid is the same both under strategic and under nonstrategic transfer price. Therefore three regions are obtained, one in which fees and pro…ts are larger under nonstrategic (below the dashed function), the second in which both fees and pro…ts are larger under strategic transfer price (above the solid function) and …nally a third region of parameters in which fees are lower under strategic but the …rm gets larger pro…ts under nonstrategic. In this last region the reduction of fees does not o¤set the distortions generated at the production level. We …nish this section by studying the linear revenue case: R (q) = vq being v > 0. Note that Proposition 1 does not apply for this case, since the result requires revenues to be strictly concave. It is immediate, though, to see that delegation does not improve …rm's pro…t by any means, that is, D = C . When revenues are linear, and prices are nonstrategically set, transfer pricing is constant over negotiating scenarios (p = v both when the factory manager reaches an agreement or not), then the …rm is unable to shift pro…ts outside the factory (R (q) R 0 (q)q = 0 at all scenarios). Thus, it is irrelevant who bargains with the supplier, since the rents at the bargaining stage are always the same. Therefore, the …rm cannot take rents away from the negotiation stage and delegation procurement has no impact. This is not the case when the HQ can use transfer prices strategically. First of all, compared to …gures 2a and 2b there is no jump down in pro…ts at p (c 1 ), that is, D = H (p (c 1 )). In other words, committing to the e¢ cient transfer price does not worsen pro…ts under the alternative ( f (c 2 ) = f (p (c 1 ) ; c 2 )), and therefore, the …rm can always replicate the outcome of the nonstrategic situation. But note that Lemma 2 still applies and therefore HQ should optimally set a transfer price below the e¢ cient, that is, p H < v, thus shifting pro…ts from the factory to the sales division and taking away some rents from the bargaining stage. The following Proposition summarizes this …nding.
Proposition 5 When revenues are linear, R (q) = vq being v > 0, commitment to a transfer price leads always to higher pro…ts, that is,
Economic forces that go against delegation of procurement
Until now, all the e¤ects we consider favor the decentralization of procurement (maybe under the form of vertical separation). In this last section we present two e¤ects that may moderate this result about the preference for delegation. The …rst one analyzes a case where the factory is not essential for the …rm since its activities can be replaced through an external alternative. The second caveat arises when the …rm is facing a supplier that may behave strategically, that is, a supplier that may announce and commit to a contract, and therefore may in ‡uence …rm's behavior.
Optimal organization when the factory is not essential
In this extension, the …rm can shut down the factory and still produce the output externally, achieving pro…ts ext that are below those that can be achieved with the e¢ cient use of the factory, ext < (c 1 ) . 15 We analyze a set-up where bargaining is e¢ cient and as a consequence in equilibrium the factory is in operation; but we show that the existence of an alternative may have consequences in the organization of procurement.
If procurement is centralized the alternative for HQ when it bargains with the supplier is to achieve pro…ts b = maxf (c 2 ); ext g in case of disagreement; and the increase in total pro…ts from an agreement is minf (c 1 ) (c 2 ); (c 1 ) ext g. The Nash bargaining agreement in which the HQ and the supplier share equally the increase in joint pro…ts can be implemented through a tari¤ that features a marginal price w = c 1 and a fee
Therefore whenever ext > (c 2 ) the external alternative improves the bargaining position of HQ under centralized procurement and end up paying a lower fee than the one in (7).
Under delegated procurement, the business unit is in charge of negotiations; but HQ must approve the agreement and we assume they are still in time to shut down the factory and produce the output externally. Therefore the fee F D that the business unit and the supplier agree on must satisfy (c 1 ) F D ext for the agreement to be approved by HQ. The outcome of the negotiation between the business unit and the supplier is a tari¤ that features a marginal price w = c 1 and a fee
When using external production does not bring much bene…t, ext < (c 2 ), the bargaining clout of HQ does not improve at all and the fee paid when procurement is centralized is the same as in Section 3,
. Therefore the result in Proposition 1 directly applies when ext < (c 2 ): Delegation is then the best way to organize procurement. An attractive external production ext > (c 2 ) will tend to be more useful under centralized procurement, however, since in delegated procurement it only works as an upper limit in the fee that the supplier can charge. As a consequence, the manager of the factory sometimes plays a softer hand than HQ in negotiations. Indeed, whenever the restriction on the fee is binding,
ext and thus F D = (c 1 ) ext , centralized procurement would allow the …rm to pay a lower fee
diate values of the external alternative, i.e. when (c 2 ) < ext < (c 1 )
, the possibility of external production increase the bargaining clout of HQ whereas it doesn't 15 We consider this alternative to be exogenous and hence we do not model how the …rm achieves that level of pro…ts.
a¤ect the fee that a business unit is charged. If we express the pro…ts under external production as ext = (c 1 ); where 2 (0; 1) measures its value, then we can write the fee F C under centralized procurement as
(1 ) (c 1 ) if 2 ( C ; 1)
; and the fee F D under delegated procurement as
where
. It is immediate to see that a strictly concave revenue function (R 00 < 0) implies C < D . We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 The fee paid in centralized procurement is below the one paid in delegated procurement, F C < F D , whenever 2 ( ; 1), where = 1
According to this Proposition, we obtain that centralized procurement is the optimal organization when the external alternative is su¢ ciently attractive, 2 ( ; 1). Delegated procurement is still chosen for values of the alternative 2 C ; for which the external alternative improves the bargaining clout of HQ in centralized bargaining; only when this external alternative is su¢ ciently attractive (and therefore HQ can ask for a low fee) is centralized procurement chosen. We can write the fee under centralized procurement as
and the fee under delegated procurement as
For any given values of parameters ; 2 (0; 1) we see that fees are lower under centralized procurement, F C < F D , when the external alternative is good enough, that is, whenever
and keeps delegating procurement otherwise. Thus, there are values of the external production 2 ( ; ) such that HQ improve their bargaining position against the e¢ cient suppliers but still prefer to delegate procurement.
Strategic supplier
The …rm is facing a supplier that may behave strategically, that is, a supplier that may announce and commit to a contract, and potentially in ‡uencing …rm's behavior. A rationale for this case may arise if the supplier is selling the product externally to the …rm and internally to other supplier's divisions through the use of transfer pricing (see . The timing is similar to the benchmark case with the exception that the tari¤ may play an strategic role. The HQ states who negotiates with the supplier, then either the HQ or the factory bargains with the supplier and announces a particular tari¤ T (q) that will not be renegotiated afterwards, and …nally the …rm starts production needs. During this section we will use the term S when the HQ delegates procurement and the supplier may behave strategically.
Under centralized procurement, the supplier improves nothing by announcing a di¤erent tari¤ from T C (q) = F C + c 1 q (c 1 ). An input price di¤erent from the marginal cost of production, that is setting w 6 = c 1 , reduces the quantity to be produced and therefore the rents to bargain with. However, under delegated procurement, this is not necessarily the case: by credibly committing to T (q) 6 = T D (q) = F D + c 1 q (c 1 ), the supplier may in ‡uence the transfer price by setting an input price w 6 = c 1 .
Under delegated procurement, the production stage leads to optimal decisions. Given the transfer price p and the input price w the factory chooses q(p(w); w) according to (2) and the HQ can achieve, given w, the optimal production by setting p(w) = R 0 (q(p(w); w)) (optimality is still conditional on the right expectations over w). At the bargaining stage and in case negotiations fail, the input price rises up to c 2 and the factory obtains f (c 2 ). When the factory and the supplier bargain, they choose the tari¤ T (q) = F + wq that maximize joint pro…ts in (6). Since this is simply a two-part tari¤ any agreement between the supplier and the factory manager should feature the restriction that the marginal wholesale price cannot be set above c 2 . Because otherwise, if the input price is set above c 2 , then the factory manager could always trade with the alternative paying a lower per unit price.
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When this constraint is not binding (w < c 2 ), the optimal input price w S solves the following …rst-order condition,
The …rst element, the direct e¤ect, is the e¤ect of the input price on the quantity produced by the factory while the second element, the strategic e¤ect, is the e¤ect that the input price has on the internal price set by the HQ. The sign of the direct e¤ect depends on the choice of the input price: it is negative if w > c 1 and positive otherwise. Instead, the strategic e¤ect is always positive, since the HQ should optimally increase the transfer price to respond to higher marginal costs (in this case, the input cost).
The following Lemma speci…es the tari¤, production decisions and …rm's pro…ts under S. It is instructive to de…ne the following threshold (c 1 ) c 1 R"(q(w S ))q(w S ) 0 where w S solves (21), 17 since the exact shape of the contract depends on the relative e¢ ciency of the supplier and the alternative. We say that the alternative is e¢ cient when when c 2 2 (c 1 ; (c 1 )) and ine¢ cient otherwise.
Lemma 2 Under S, the optimal contract displays the following characteristics: (a) When c 2 2 (c 1 ; (c 1 )), the contract is F S = 1 2 (c 2 c 1 ) q(c 2 ) and w S = c 2 , production q = q(c 2 ), and …rm's pro…ts are
(w S c 1 )q(w S ) and w S 2 (c 1 ; c 2 ), production q = q(w S ) < q(c 1 ), and …rm's pro…ts are
First of all, the tari¤ between the factory and the supplier always leads to ine¢ cient production, w > c 1 . When the strategic e¤ect was absent setting w = c 1 was indeed optimal. Now, in this framework, when w = c 1 , the …rst order condition in (21) is still positive, @p @c 1 q(p(c 1 ); c 1 ) > 0. Thus, both the supplier and the factory bene…t by distorting input prices so as to in ‡uence transfer prices even though this comes at the cost of producing ine¢ ciently. By increasing the input price, the transfer price is set according to the real marginal cost, and joint pro…ts increase. The supplier reaps some of those extra pro…ts through the bargaining process.
The exact value of the distortion depends on the relative e¢ ciency of the alternative and the supplier. When the alternative is e¢ cient (case (a) in Lemma 2) the input price 16 In other words, the contract between the factory manager and the supplier is a non-exclusive dealing. We could assume the HQ delegates to the factory manager the decision to sign an exclusive dealing with the supplier, that is, a two-part tari¤ including an exclusivity clause; a clause forcing the …rm to buy the input at the supplier. Including this clause into contracts implies that agreements featuring an input w > c 2 may be perfectly the solution of factory and manager's joint pro…ts. By the end of this section we brie ‡y discuss the consequences of allowing the factory manager to sign exclusive contracts. We do so by assuming two cases: one in which exclusive dealing is subject to the approval of the HQ and a second one in which the decision to sign exclusive dealing is completely delegated. 17 For instance, for a linear demand case in which R(q) = (1 b 2 q)q and C(q) = m 2 q 2 (c 1 ) =
(1 )+c1 2 is set at its maximum level, w = c 2 , and the …rm thus produces at its lowest level of production, q(c 2 ). Instead, when the alternative is more ine¢ cient (case (b) in Lemma 2), the input price is set at an intermediate unit price, w 2 (c 1 ; c 2 ), but still the production is ine¢ ciently low. It is worth mentioning that the …x component F D may take negative values; it is the supplier who pays the …rm (the factory, indeed) for accepting the terms of the contract. The intuition of this negative …x component may be seen in the following way. When the alternative is ine¢ cient, both the factory and the manager agrees on setting the largest marginal wholesale price possible, w = c 2 . Net of …xed payments, the factory gets exactly f (c 2 ) (the same amount obtained under the alternative). Since the rents generated under this agreement rises up to (c 2 c 1 ) q(c 2 ), the factory reaps half of those rents; rents that can only be satis…ed through the …x component. 18 We now focus on supplier's pro…ts when the supplier can commit to the contract stated in Lemma 2, and we relate supplier's pro…ts to the ones obtained under D and under C. Let us de…ne by the subscript i sup the pro…ts of the supplier for a speci…c way of organizing procurement activities i 2 fC; S; Dg. It is immediate to see from Proposition 1 that
The following result allows us to state that supplier's pro…t under S remain between pro…ts of D and S.
Lemma 3 When the supplier behaves strategically, if
First, as compared to the delegated procurement case, the supplier gets larger pro…ts by setting a distorted input price w S > c 1 . Note that, unlike the HQ behaving strategically, the supplier can always replicate the e¢ cient contract, setting w = c 1 and grabbing rents through the fee F D . By distorting the input price, the supplier can manage to e¤ectively in ‡uence the transfer pricing, increasing joint pro…ts and eventually grabbing some of those extra pro…ts. Second, as compared to the centralized procurement case, the supplier achieves lower pro…ts than the centralized situation: the loss of e¢ ciency caused by the distortion of the input price, w S > c 1 ; is always larger than the increase in supplier's pro…ts due to the commitment e¤ect.
Given this potential unwanted production levels, the HQ may prefer to centralize procurement activities. Centralizing it raises production up to its e¢ cient level, q(c 1 ), and hence pro…ts (net of …xed payment) increases, as well. However, centralizing does reduce …rm's bargaining strength increasing the …x component and reducing …rm's pro…ts (see Proposition 1). The next proposition shows a case where the …rm always centralizes procurement.
Proposition 7 When …rm's alternative is e¢ cient that is, when c 2 2 (c 1 ; (c 1 )), HQ centralizes procurement.
This result states that, anticipating supplier's strategic behavior, the …rm should centralize procurement if there are no substantial di¤erences between the two sources of the input. The distortions generated by delegating activities, i.e., producing q(c 2 ) instead of q(c 1 ), cannot be compensated by the positive fee paid by the supplier. This cuto¤ (c 1 )
should be seen as lower bound since, as long as w = c 2 > c 1 , pro…ts under centralized are strictly larger than delegated procurement when the supplier behaves strategically.
When the alternative is ine¢ cient (the optimal solution of the contract is an interior solution) distortions are not so pronounced and the …rm may prefer to delegate procurement. The di¤erence of pro…ts between centralized and delegated procurement can be rearranged in the following way:
First, centralizing procurement provides more pro…ts than delegating it because pro…ts obtained under the alternative are always larger, 1 2 ( (c 2 ) f (c 2 )) > 0 but this e¤ect is reduced the lower the e¢ ciency of the alternative, that is,
0. In the limiting case when there is no alternative, i.e., the best case scenario for delegated procurement, the …rm may still centralize procurement. To be this true, the …rst element of the former equation should be positive, that is, delegation never takes place if, after rearranging,
the gains of producing e¢ ciently are larger than the gains of paying less at the bargaining stage. The sign of this inequality is not conclusive for general functions but we can compare di¤erent organizational structures when the demand is linear generating revenues R(q) = 1 b q 2 q and cost are quadratic C(q) = m q 2 2 . We know from Section 3 that centralized procurement leads to w = c 1 and a fee F C in (9) and pro…ts C in (10). Under S, the optimal contract leads to a two part tari¤ with the following fee F S and unit price w S :
Then the supplier's pro…ts are
where the exact shape of the contract depends on the constraint w c 2 being binding or not (see Lemma (2)) where the cuto¤ (c 1 ) =
(1 )+c 1 2 2 (c 1 ; 1) when the demand is linear and costs are quadratic. Comparing equations (22) and (10) , and delegates otherwise.
The former Proposition shows a case where, in some cases, it is more convenient to centralize whereas in others delegating procurement is the optimal way to organize procurement activities. When the alternative is e¢ cient, centralize procurement emerges as the optimal organization; the argument is similar to Proposition 7, e¢ ciency distortions are larger than potential gains at the bargaining stage. Moreover, it is easy to see that (c 1 ) > (c 1 ): HQ centralizes procurement beyond stated in proposition 7, con…rming the idea that the cuto¤ (c 1 ) is a lower bound on centralizing procurement activities. When the e¢ ciency of the alternative worsens, the …rm is in a weaker position and being tougher at the bargaining stage becomes more relevant than e¢ ciency considerations.
A …nal comment concerns the assumption on the characteristics of the contract signed between the supplier and the factory manager. We have imposed a restriction on the input price w; a restriction well justi…ed if the contract is a non-exclusive deal. Assume though that the factory manager and the supplier may sign a two part tari¤ including an exclusive clause and assume the HQ delegates such decision to the factory manager. The basic di¤erence between these two cases arises when the restriction w c 2 under non-exclusive deals is active. Under exclusive deals, the optimal tari¤ avoid the restriction w c 2 ; the tari¤ is simply the solution to (21), implying an input price featuring w S > c 2 if c 2 2 (c 1 ; (c 1 )). It is immediate to see that the unconstrained joint pro…t maximization leads to higher pro…ts to both the supplier and the factory, but since w > c 2 > c 1 then overall pro…ts generated by this agreement are even lower,
. Given these two observations, …rm's pro…ts under non-exclusive are always larger than under exclusive deals (or the same level of pro…ts when the restriction is not active). Anticipating this, the HQ centralizes procurement if w S > c 2 . by a similar argument provided in Proposition 7.
Another possibility would be to allow the factory manager to sign contracts subject to HQ's approval. In this case the factory manager and the supplier maximize joint pro…ts subject to the constraint that the agreement must be at least as good as the alternative, that is, S w S F S (c 2 ). Even if we add this restriction, the agreement obtained can never provide larger pro…ts than under non-exclusive deals. When it is optimal to set w S > c 2 either the HQ would block the agreement and the supplier and the factory manager set precisely w S = c 2 or it does not block the agreement and the …rm sets a larger input price. In either case, pro…ts the HQ anticipates this ine¢ cient behavior and prefers to centralize procurement.
Finally, given that
C sup as stated in Lemma 3 and the fact that the …rm may recover procurement decisions (as discussed in Propositions 7 and 8), the supplier always improves pro…ts as compared to the delegated situation (Section 3). This improvement comes from two di¤erent channels: (a) if the HQ delegates procurement the supplier distorts the input price, setting w S > c 1 , thus increasing pro…ts. The second mechanism arises when the HQ, anticipating a high distortion of input prices, may take control over procurement decisions leading to an improvement of supplier's pro…t (since
Proposition 9 Committing to a contract always improves supplier's pro…t. When the alternative is e¢ cient, announcing a distorting contract deters delegation of procurement.
The next …gure graphically represents the former result. We graphically represent supplier's pro…ts as a function of the alternative e¢ ciency c 2 . First, the dotted line represents supplier's pro…ts under D, the benchmark case; the dashed line represents supplier's pro…ts under C, that is, when the supplier bargains with the HQ and …nally the light dashed line represents supplier's pro…ts under S, that is, pro…ts obtained if the contract signed was the one de…ned in Lemma 2. The solid line represents supplier's pro…ts when HQ's decisions to either centralize or delegate procurement are taking into account. When strategic considerations were absent, it was optimal to delegate decisions to the factory manager (Proposition 1), leading to low supplier's pro…ts (the dotted line). When the supplier behaves strategically, it may happen that the HQ is forced to take over procurement decisions leading to an increase of supplier's pro…ts (from dotted to dashed) or it allows the factory to bargain even if it leads to ine¢ cient production choices. Still, the supplier improves pro…ts by distorting input prices since it is able to in ‡uence transfer price (from dotted to light dashed line) 
Concluding remarks
The main goal of this paper is to understand the bene…ts of delegating procurement to a business unit in charge of production. We show conditions under which the delegation of this activity improves …rm's bargaining against suppliers. The bene…ts arises as long, by delegating, factory's pro…ts are lower than …rm's pro…ts which improves …rm's bargaining positioning. We show, unlike Arya (2007) , the existence of those bene…ts both under strategic and non-strategic transfer prices. Further, we show that the use of strategic transfer prices does not necessarily improve …rm's pro…ts and they may be counterproductive. Alternative organizational arrangements such as vertical separation may be an alternative but not superior way to organize procurement activities. We extend the initial framework by introducing other aspects that may moderate the decision to decentralize …rm's procurement. First, the …rm owns an external alternative that allows to shut down the factory. Second, the factory and the supplier privately negotiate the input price. In both cases, we obtain situations in which still the …rm prefers …rms'procurement to be in factory's hands.
The model presented in this paper aims to characterize an industry structure in which the …rm needs to acquire an input from an external source to produce a good, and then the sales division markets the good. This industry structure naturally captures situations in which a divisionalized …rm needs to interact with key suppliers or engages negotiations with union labours at the factory level. As a consequence, the agent in charge of leading procurement negotiations must be the one with the adequate expertise, that is, the agent in charge of production decisions or the HQ. Our result on delegation is not necessarily restricted to this particular industry structure and can be extended to other industries in which production decisions fall on the agent in charge of marketing the product and where our results remain essentially unchanged. A potential example of this industry structure can be captured by the broadband industry. In this industry, the …rm owns a technology able to send content at a high speed but it also need to distribute content in order to satisfy its …nal consumer. In this case, the sales division, having a superior knowledge of consumer's preferences, should be the one leading procurement negotiations with content producers, deciding which set of products are of interest.
Finally, there are at least two natural extensions. First, the multiplant case: note that in this case, the …rm can use the organizational structure to increase …rm's bargaining positioning, but it can also shift production to increase its positioning. When the …rm owns several factories, it may not always be optimal to keep decentralization at the factory level, and the …rm partly centralize …rm's procurement by building a new layer, namely, a central purchasing. Second, the introduction of uncertainty at the demand's side. In that framework, the sales manager knows the true realization of the demand but cannot communicate it to the HQ or to the factory (following Weitzman, 1974) . Thus, the problem faced by the HQ is to whom provide authority over quantity; to the sales division and taking advantage of the local information knowledge or to the factory and reinforce the bargaining position against the supplier.
Appendix A
Below we show the outcomes of bargaining when procurement is centralized and when it is delegated
Bargaining under centralised procurement
The optimal contract between the supplier and the headquarter is the solution to the following problem
Let us …rst take logs to convert the program into
and the …rst order conditions are
Note …rst that from @ @F = 0 we obtain the …xed component
Note that by applying the envelope theorem
which holds if and only if w = c 1 since @q(w) @w = 1 R 00 C 00 < 0. Thus, w = c 1 and
Bargaining under delegated procurement
The optimal contract between the supplier and the factory is the solution to the following problem max fF;wg
and the …rst order conditions derived from the lagrangian are
Note …rst that from @L @F = 0 we obtain
where the last equivalence is obtained by noting that
Finally, since @q(w) @w < 0, w = c 1 . Finally, plug w = c 1 to obtain the payment
> 0 () R 00 < 0 and the stated result is obtained. QED Proof of Proposition 3.
First, …rm's pro…ts when the transfer price is not strategic are D = (c 1 )
) and di¤erentiating (and applying envelope theorem) with respect to c 2 , we get
rearranging and noting that
Finally, the optimal piecewise nonstrategic price is . Thus, the following threshold function for pro…ts
states that strategic transfer prices provide larger pro…ts if c f ( ) (and nonstrategic transfer prices leads to larger pro…ts otherwise).
We do a similar exercise for fees, comparing , and
which is true when c < 
which is true when c < 1
.Thus, the following threshold function for fees
states that strategic transfer prices leads to lower payments if c g( ) (and nonstrategic transfer prices leads to lower payments otherwise).
Finally, it is left to show that f ( ) g( ). First, it is almost straightforward to see that f ( ) g( ) when > , this implies that f ( ) g( ) holds in this interval. QED Proof of Proposition 5. First, we show that (a) D = C when revenues are linear and then we show that (b) H > D . To prove (a), under nonstrategic transfer pricing quantities are e¢ cient both under delegated and under centralized procurement and we want to prove that
The e¢ cient transfer price is p = R 0 (q (w)) = v when revenues are linear. Note that (w) = f (w) () R (q(w)) (C(q (w) + wq (w)) = R 0 (q(w))q(w) (C(q (w) + wq (w)) which is true if revenues are linear. Thus, < 0 implies w S = c 1 R 00 (q(w (c 1 ))) q(w (c 1 )) = (c 1 ) > c 1 . Note that this implies that w = c 1 cannot be a local optimum and therefore w 2 (c 1; c 2 ). Now, take the case > 0, which implies that w = c 2 and F S (w) becomes F S (c 2 ) = 1 2 (c 2 c 1 )q(c 2 ) < 0. Finally, the restriction is active when c 2 2 (c 1 ; (c 1 )) and inactive otherwise. QED Proof of Lemma 3. We want to show that it is a direct implication of (21): it is optimal to distort the contract, and set w S > c 1 (although the supplier can always set w = c 1 ), thus, joint pro…ts, and as a consequence supplier's pro…ts, are not maximized at c 1 . Second, we show that Second, under w S the whole …rm achieves pro…ts (w S ),which is larger than the pro…ts of the factory f (w S ) since (w S ) f (w S ) = R(q(w S )) R 0 (q(w S ))q(w S ) > 0 if R" < 0. Besides, if w S < c 2 , we know that f (w S ) f (c 2 ) < (w S ) (c 2 ). Therefore, adding (w which is always true since q(c 2 ) is not the optimal quantity at marginal costs of the input c 1 . QED Proof of Proposition 8. We need to compare C with S . On the one hand, C = 1 2 ( (c 1 ) (c 2 )), and when the demand is linear and costs are quadratic, we have previously derived optimal quantity, q (w) =
(1 w) m
, and operating pro…ts, (w) = On the other hand, S is de…ned in (22). Now, let us make the following change of variable that simpli…es calculus: d 1 = (1 c 1 ) ; 1 (1 c 1 ) C sup , that is, the e¢ cient supplier prefers procurement to be centralized rather than delegated, and in the case it is delegated, it obtains higher pro…ts by distorting input prices. Second, the HQ anticipating supplier's behavior may decide to centralize procurement or to delegate it to the factory manager; when the alternative is e¢ cient the HQ always centralizes procurement (Proposition 7) and when the alternative is very ine¢ cient the …rm may prefer to delegate procurement and allow for distorted input prices (as in the example summarized in Proposition 8). In either case, supplier's improves pro…ts if we compare it to the delegation without distortions of the input price. The second part exists whenever the HQ decides to centralize procurement, which happens when the alternative is e¢ cient. QED
